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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores a proposed method for measuring the degree of Islamisation 
within a community, where Islamisation is defined as the extent to which Islam and 
religious concepts and rationale are used to organise and decide within the community 
at the political, social, cultural and personal levels. This proposed method involves the 
aggregation and analysis of measurements from different aspects by which a 
community could be Islamised, in order to obtain an assessment of the general state of 
Islamisation within that community. To assess the method’s feasibility, this thesis 
deploys it in two case studies of the Indonesian provinces of Central Java and West 
Sumatra during the Reformasi era. These case studies demonstrate that this method 
can be used to derive substantiated broad assessments about Islamisation. These 
assessments suggest West Sumatra is more Islamised than Central Java, although both 
provinces have experienced Islamisation during Reformasi. 
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Glossary 
Dakwah  The proselytising of Islam and Islam-related concepts. 
Hajj   The annual Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca. 
Jilbab A long and loose-fitting outer garment worn by some Muslim 
women that covers the entire body. 
Kabupaten  Regency; a territorial administrative unit used in Indonesia. 
Kota   City; a territorial administrative unit used in Indonesia. 
Madrasah Islamic schools. 
Musholla  An area for the convenient performance of the daily Islamic 
canonical prayers, but not for congregational worship. 
Pancasila The foundational philosophy of the Republic of Indonesia. 
Perda Syariah Religious laws or regulations passed by local governments in 
Indonesia. “Perda” is an abbreviation for “Peraturan Daerah”, 
which means regional regulations.  
Pesantren  Islamic boarding schools. 
Orde Baru  President Suharto’s New Order regime (1966-1998). 
Qurban  An Islamic holiday, also known as Eid al-Adha in Arabic. 
Reformasi Term used to describe the current era in Indonesia following 
President Suharto’s 1998 resignation. 
Salat The five daily canonical prayers required of Muslims in Islam. 
Syariah Religious laws, rules, and lifestyle decisions according to 
Islamic tenets. 
Zakat   A form of alms-giving practiced in Islam.  
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Chapter 1  
 
Introduction 
 
 
The role of Islam in the lives of Indonesia’s Muslims is as diverse as the multi-
ethnic archipelago they inhabit. While there are Indonesian Muslims who regard Islam 
primarily as a set of religious rituals and teachings for their spiritual needs, there are 
also Indonesian Muslims who infuse Islam into multiple aspects of their lives, such as 
using religious rationale to guide their political beliefs and actions and to select goods 
and services for consumption. Yet these categories are not dualistic; the variations and 
permutations of beliefs and practices over such issues among Indonesian Muslims are 
as diverse as the population itself.  
There are benefits in attempting to synthesise this complex tally of beliefs and 
practices into assessments that provide a holistic depiction of the role and importance 
of Islam within a community, and which can also be compared against similarly 
derived assessments of other communities. This would supplement existing scholarly 
studies of Islam in Indonesia that are typically focused on entities that are explicitly 
Islamic, such as Islamic political parties and Islamic associations, at the expense of 
other entities within society that are less explicit about how they have been influenced 
by Islam (Van Dijk 2013, 15). This would also augment existing thematic studies of 
Indonesian Islam that are focused on discussing specific aspects and issues such as the 
role of Islam vis-à-vis Pancasila in Indonesian society, or the extent of Arab influence 
in Indonesian Islam (Burhani 2013, 25-34).  
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But a detailed and comprehensive study of the role of Islam in the lives of 
Indonesia’s 230 million Muslims would be a grandiose undertaking. Even when 
limited to a fraction of Indonesia’s Muslim population, the detailed nature of a 
thorough investigative study will remain a daunting challenge, given the multitude of 
ways Islam could potentially manifest in the lives of its adherents. 
I propose the application of a heuristic method to make this task manageable 
yet capable of producing analytically useful results. This method involves analysing 
selected religion-related parameters of sub-communities within Indonesia to obtain 
meaningful prima facie assessments about the role of Islam in these communities. This 
method will also endeavour to use a consistent and transparent criterion when 
distilling information and detailing the rationalisations behind the final assessments 
reached, so that the results obtained by this method can be improved upon in 
subsequent research efforts or used as a basis to identify and rationalise subsequent in-
depth research into specific areas of interest.  
In the remainder of this first chapter, I will explain the steps involved in this 
proposed method. In the next chapter, I detail the results obtained from applying this 
method to two case studies of the Indonesian provinces of Central Java and West 
Sumatra. My analysis of the results of these case studies is in the third chapter. The 
last chapter concludes this thesis with a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of 
this proposed method. 
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Defining Islamisation 
The method proposed by this thesis for measuring the role of Islam in a 
community involves using clearly defined parameters to measure, assess and 
characterise the degree to which Islam plays a significant role in various aspects of life 
within the community being studied. 
As there are multiple ways where Islam can manifest itself in daily life, I will 
standardise the unit of analysis for this method as “Islamisation”. My definition of 
Islamisation is adapted from the versions used by Merle Calvin Ricklefs and Bernhard 
Platzdasch. Platzdasch defines Islamisation as the increase in the number of 
Indonesian Muslims practising religious behaviour, including praying, fasting, and 
adopting Islamic fashions in their attire (Platzdasch 2009, 333). While Ricklefs does 
not explicitly define Islamisation in his trilogy of books about the Islamisation of Java, 
Ricklefs did state that his books were focused on the connection between what people 
believed and what they consequently did (Ricklefs 2012, xviii-xix). Thus by using 
Ricklefs’ idea as a guiding principle to expand on Platzdasch’s definition, I define 
Islamisation as the identifiable extent to which Islam-related concepts and rationale 
have been employed as a primary principle around which decisions are made in all 
aspects of life including politics, cultural practices, and personal behaviour.  
 
Measuring Islamisation 
The first step in this proposed method for measuring Islamisation involves 
listing out the parameters within each aspect of life to be measured and explaining 
how these parameters could indicate the presence of Islamisation. For example, a 
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parameter about politics would be the number of votes obtained by Islamic political 
parties compared to the number of votes obtained by non-Islamic political parties 
during elections. In this case, I would be attempting to identify the extent to which 
election results demonstrate people’s preference for politicians who are highly 
associated with Islam or Islam-related issues.  
The next step is to detail the measurements for each parameter. These 
measurements can be either quantitative or qualitative. The aforementioned example 
of number of votes obtained by Islamic political parties versus non-Islamic political 
parties is an example of a quantitative measurement, although the subsequent 
assessment about the degree of Islamisation demonstrated by this measurement is 
necessarily qualitative in nature. It is also possible to use qualitative measurements in 
instances where quantification is not possible, not available, or not meaningful. 
The last step is to analyse these measurements to deduce the general state of 
Islamisation in the community. The method used in arriving at this overall assessment 
is primarily qualitative, as imposing standardised weightages or processes for 
evaluating the various parameters used will likely fail to satisfactorily account for 
contextual and substantive differences between and within communities across time 
and space. The analysis will also focus on identifying the presence of Islamisation in 
trends over time, as opposed to attempting to identify Islamisation from specific data 
points.  
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Chapter 2 
Case Studies: Central Java and West Sumatra 
 
 
This thesis seeks to assess the feasibility of the proposed method outlined in 
the previous chapter by using it to conduct two case studies in the Indonesian 
provinces of Central Java and West Sumatra. This chapter details the basis and 
objectives of these case studies, the time period, the parameters used and the specific 
aspects of Islamisation of which their measurements are indicative, and details of the 
measurements obtained. The assessments derived from analysing these measurements 
are detailed in the next chapter, while the final chapter provides an assessment of the 
feasibility of this method. 
 
Basis and Objective for Case Studies  
This section discusses my reasons and objectives for choosing Central Java and 
West Sumatra for the case studies. The objectives of these case studies are to 
demonstrate the proposed method’s ability to generate measurements of Islamisation, 
compare these measurements across cases, and use them to better understand the 
societies being studied. The case studies have been specifically scoped to better 
achieve these objectives. These scoping decisions include limiting the number of case 
studies to two, both at the province-level, so that these objectives are manageable and 
achievable. Also, I chose Central Java and West Sumatra for the case studies since 
their demographic similarities reduces complexity when measuring Islamisation, while 
their political and cultural differences provide opportunities to use Islamisation as an 
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explanatory tool to better understand their societies. I will now proceed to explain 
these scoping decisions in detail.   
I decided to have multiple case studies instead of a single case study as using 
multiple case studies allows me to juxtapose the results from one case study against 
another. As case studies are inherently weak at ensuring the external validity of their 
conclusions (Gerring 2009, 101-102), this will allow me to better ascertain how well 
this method fares at facilitating comparative analyses of Islamisation. 
My decision to limit these case studies to two was borne out of practical 
considerations. While there is no theoretical limit on the number of case studies one 
could run in a study utilising this method, limiting the number of case studies to two 
makes this thesis manageable and allows it to focus on demonstrating the application 
of this method so that the method’s strengths and weaknesses can be better evaluated. 
Practical considerations also underpinned my decision to peg these case studies 
at the province level, instead of conducting lower-level studies at the kota and 
kabupaten levels, or even at the district and village levels. As the largest official 
administrative unit of Indonesia, province-level statistics and data are generally more 
abundant and easily accessible than similar statistics for the smaller administrative 
units.  
The decision to select the provinces of Central Java and West Sumatra for the 
case studies was premised on two reasons. The first was to select provinces that were 
relatively homogenous in terms of their religious and ethnic demographics. This was 
to reduce complexity in the findings by making it less likely that Islamisation had 
taken place along religious or ethnic lines within the province. Both Central Java and 
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West Sumatra are inhabited largely by Muslims. As of 2017, 96.8% of Central Java’s 
34.2 million inhabitants and 98.1% of West Sumatra’s 5.32 million inhabitants were 
Muslims (BPS Provinsi Jawa Tengah 2018, 56, 125; BPS Provinsi Sumatera Barat 
2018, 173, 298). Similarly, both Central Java and West Sumatra are largely inhabited 
by one ethnic group. 97% of Central Java’s inhabitants are Javanese, while most of the 
remainder are Sundanese (1.4%) or Chinese (0.4%) (Na’im and Syaputra 2011, 36-
41). 87% of West Sumatra’s inhabitants are Minangkabau, and most of the remainder 
are Batak (4.6%) or Javanese (4.5%) (Na’im and Syaputra 2011, 36-41). 
However, a significant demographic-related drawback of selecting Central 
Java and West Sumatra would be the disparity between the sizes of their respective 
populations, which leaves open the possibility that the findings from comparing 
Islamisation in both provinces could be explained by their disparity in size. According 
to the 2010 census, Central Java’s population of 32.4 million is more than six times 
larger than West Sumatra’s 4.85 million population (Indiyanto 2013, 16). To mitigate 
this potential drawback, I will use the appropriate units of analysis where relevant 
during cross-province comparisons, such as intra-province changes over time that are 
measured in proportional rather than absolute values.   
Another reason for selecting Central Java and West Sumatra was to use the 
findings on Islamisation in these provinces to obtain greater insights on pre-existing 
political and cultural differences between these two provinces. This thesis will focus 
on two such areas of difference. The first would be how both provinces had voted in a 
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consistently different manner in their last two gubernatorial elections.1 The incumbent 
governors of both provinces are currently serving their second term, but Central Java’s 
governor Ganjar Pranowo is from the non-Islamic political party Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P), while West Sumatra’s governor Irwan Prayitno is 
from the Islamic political party Partai Kedilan Sejahtera (PKS). The second area of 
difference would be how scholars have generally identified the Minangkabau in West 
Sumatra to be more Islamic than most other Indonesians (Keddie 1987, 1-2; Simon 
2012, 238-242).  
 
Time-period 
 For this thesis, I will measure Islamisation in these two provinces from the 
beginning of the Reformasi period in 1998 to the current day. In doing so, I seek to 
continue earlier research by scholars about the increased role of Islam in the politics 
and society of a post-Orde Baru Indonesia. One example of such research is the 
increased popularity of Islam-themed commercial products ranging from fashion to 
literature, entertainment, and financial services (Utama 2015, 121-124; Rinaldo 2013, 
51). Prior research has also suggested that Indonesian Muslims have generally become 
more pious in recent years, as demonstrated through changes in their lifestyle choices 
such as more female Muslims opting to don the veil and more Muslim parents desiring 
an Islamic education for their children (Utama 2015, 121). 
                                                 
1 2013 and 2018 for Central Java, and 2010 and 2015 for West Sumatra. 
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Scholars have previously documented how this increased piety has led to 
changes in public life in Indonesia. Religious political issues were observed to have 
become more salient during Reformasi as both Islamic and non-Islamic political 
parties adapted their rhetoric and policy positions to compete for the support of an 
increasingly pious electorate (Tanuwidjaja 2010, 44-45). At the same time, the 
phenomenon of public moralism justified through religious rationale had visibly 
become more prevalent, such as in the form of self-styled Islamic vigilantes 
committing thuggery and extortion against vice-related activities and religious 
minorities (Wilson 2008, 199-203).  
 
Parameters Used 
I have taken into consideration these earlier research efforts when deciding on 
the parameters of Islamisation to be measured in the case studies of Central Java and 
West Sumatra. There are nine such parameters, and they are:  
1) votes cast during elections for Islamic political parties and politicians versus 
non-Islamic political parties and politicians; 
2) the quantity and enforcement of local religious laws and regulations; 
3) enrolment in Islamic schools versus non-Islamic schools;  
4) the quantity of Muslim places of worship;  
5) the prevalence of religion-related intolerance; 
6) the quantity of Muslims performing the hajj pilgrimage;  
7) the quantity of Muslims involved in Qurban rituals; 
8) the popularity of Islamic banking services; 
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9) the popularity of Arabic names. 
The following sub-sections are organised according to these nine parameters. 
Each sub-section begins by explaining what the parameter is and how it is relevant to 
Islamisation, before detailing the results for the two case studies and a brief analysis of 
the significance of these results for Islamisation. 
 
Islamic versus Non-Islamic Political Parties and Politicians 
Background and relevance 
The onset of Reformasi had resulted in a multitude of Islamic political parties 
sprouting onto the political scene. 12 of the 48 political parties that took part in the 
first Reformasi-era elections in 1999 were acknowledged by the electoral commission 
as Islamic, a stark contrast to the Orde Baru regime that allowed only the Partai 
Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) to function as the sole Islamic political party for most 
of the Orde Baru (KPU 1999, 35-37). 
But the results of the 1999 elections made it clear that the supply of political 
parties, both Islamic and non-Islamic, had far exceeded the electorate’s demand for 
political diversity. Only 21 of the 48 political parties competing in the 1999 elections 
managed to win seats at the national parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat – DPR) 
and of these, nine were Islamic political parties (KPU 2008). Most of the unsuccessful 
smaller political parties would eventually depart the political scene. By the time of the 
2014 elections, only five significant Islamic political parties remained: the Partai 
Amanat Nasional (PAN), the Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB), the Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa (PKB), the PKS, and the PPP.  
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Some prior scholarly research had suggested that these Islamic political parties 
may not have differed much from the non-Islamic political parties in terms of both 
policy and actions. For example, in their effort to attract a broader base of voters, 
Islamic political parties were found to have generally downplayed in their rhetoric 
religious issues such as instituting syariah, and instead focused on general tropes of 
good governance such as tackling corruption and promoting economic growth 
(Platzdasch 2009, 323-324). At the same time, individual Islamic politicians on the 
ground were observed to have employed vote-buying and other forms of patronage 
politics so as to be able to compete on an equal footing with other politicians who 
were utilising such strategies (Ismanto and Thaha 2016, 141-145).  
In addition, some non-Islamic political parties, particularly Partai Golongan 
Karya (Golkar) and Partai Demokrat (PD), had at times adopted positions that were as 
pro-Islam as the Islamic political parties. For example, Golkar and PD politicians had 
sided with Islamic political parties on controversial religion-related issues such as the 
passing of the 2003 education law that required students to receive religious lessons 
according to their professed faith and from teachers professing the same religion2, and 
the 2008 anti-pornography law that was advocated on religious and moral grounds 
against concerns of a potential threat to civil liberties (Tanuwidjaja 2010, 41). Apart 
from political opportunism, this might also be partly due to the presence of some 
Golkar members who were former Islamic politicians who had suppressed their 
                                                 
2 This requirement was controversial as it was perceived as a deliberate attempt 
to effectively outlaw attempts to teach Muslim students about Christianity in Christian 
schools, where a significant number of Muslim students were enrolled (Baswedan 
2004, 677). 
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Islamic identity and Islamist aspirations to join Golkar during the Orde Baru 
(Platzdasch 2009, 56). 
But I would argue that Indonesia’s Islamic political parties remain significantly 
different from their non-Islamic counterparts in two aspects. Firstly, unlike non-
Islamic political parties as a general whole, these Islamic political parties have in 
common their belief that Islamic concepts and teachings should be used to govern 
Indonesia, even if they do not share a common approach and level of enthusiasm in 
pursing their belief (Platzdasch 2009, 322-329; Ismanto and Thaha 2016, 141-145). 
For example, scholarly research has shown that the PKS has a relatively clear intent 
and plan to acquire state power for the purpose of enforcing a moral life onto Muslims 
via syariah, as compared to the PPP which has not been keen to intellectually 
reconcile its catch-all rhetoric in which it espouses to be pro-syariah and pro-pluralism 
at the same time (Platzdasch 2009, 193-205).  
More importantly, surveys have shown that where the public is concerned, the 
Islamic political parties are still regarded as a distinct category separate from the non-
Islamic political parties, regardless of the latter’s occasional support for pro-Islam 
causes. A 2009 survey by the survey firm Lingkaran Survei Indonesia revealed that 
the public perceived the PKS, PKB, PAN, PPP and PBB as Islamic political parties, 
while Golkar, PD and PDI-P were perceived as secular, Pancasila-based or nationalist 
political parties (Tanuwidjaja 2010, 40). 
Taking all these factors into consideration, I will attempt to measure 
Islamisation in this parameter as defined by support for Islamic political parties and 
politicians versus support for non-Islamic political parties and politicians during 
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elections via two measurements. The first measurement analyses the candidates and 
outcomes of the gubernatorial elections in Central Java and West Sumatra, while the 
second measurement looks at the number of seats Islamic political parties have been 
able to secure in the DPR and the provincial parliaments (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat 
Daerah – DPRD) from these two provinces. The results of these two measurements 
will be interpreted to ascertain the extent of Islamisation defined by the degree to 
which voters are supportive of political parties and politicians who are closely 
identified with Islam, be it through their party identity or campaign promises.  
 
Measurements: Central Java 
 The gubernatorial elections in Central Java for 2008, 2013 and 2018 suggest 
that Islamic political parties and religious political platforms have limited support 
from Central Java’s voters. The winners of these three gubernatorial elections have all 
been from the non-Islamic political party, PDI-P. The incumbent governor, PDI-P’s 
Ganjar Pranowo, won in 2013 and 2018, and the PDI-P candidate Bibit Waluyo won 
in 2008 (Utami 2013b; Utami 2013c). There are no indications that religious issues 
had played a significant role in Ganjar and Bibit’s electoral campaigns, which were 
largely centred around promises of further economic development for Central Java 
(Kompas 2018; Suara Pembaruan 2013).  
This was also largely the case for one of their opponents, a PKS candidate 
named Hadi Prabowo who stood for the 2013 gubernatorial election. Hadi’s campaign 
also largely revolved around economic issues, although one of Hadi’s electoral 
promises appeared to be explicitly religion-related. This promise concerned Hadi’s 
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plan to improve society by upholding the values of “faith, piety and local wisdom” 
(keimanan, ketakwaan, dan kearifan local), which can be reasonably interpreted as a 
promise to uphold Islamic values along with other local religious and spiritual 
practices in a predominantly Muslim province (Utami 2013a; Suara Pembaruan 2013). 
Hadi did not fare well in the 2013 election, finishing a distant third with only about 
21% of the vote compared to Ganjar’s 49% and Bibit’s 30% (Utami 2013c).  
Election results for Central Java’s DPR and provincial DPRD legislators 
during Reformasi also suggest that there has been limited support for candidates from 
Islamic political parties. During Reformasi, Islamic political parties only managed to 
obtain 35% to 42% of seats in Central Java’s 100-seat provincial DPRD (see Table 1). 
Similarly, only 36% to 42% of Central Java’s DPR legislators during Reformasi were 
from Islamic political parties (see Table 2). 
Table 1. Provincial Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah legislators from Islamic and 
non-Islamic political parties for Central Java from 1999 to 2019 
 Islamic political parties Non-Islamic political parties Total 
2015-2019 39 61 100 
2009-2014 37 63 100 
2004-2009 42 58 100 
1999-2004 35 653 100 
Sources: Pemilu.asia, n.d.d; Pemilu.asia, n.d.c; Apriyanto 2007, 281; Hadi 2004, 54. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 This figure includes 10 legislators from the police and the military. 
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Table 2. Proportion of Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat legislators from Islamic and non-
Islamic political parties for Central Java from 1999 to 2019 
 Islamic political parties Non-Islamic political parties 
2014-2019 37% 63% 
2009-2014 36% 64% 
2004-2009 42% 58% 
1999-2004 38% 62% 
Sources: Pemilu.asia, n.d.b; Pemilu.asia, n.d.a; Apriyanto 2007, 273; KPU 1999, 97. 
 
These details suggest that support for Islamic political parties in Central Java 
has been consistently limited to a minority of the population during Reformasi thus 
far. This limited support may explain why candidates in Central Java’s gubernatorial 
elections, even those backed by Islamic political parties, have shown little interest in 
having more religious issues among their campaign promises. Thus it can be surmised 
that Islamisation in Central Java in the form of popular support for political parties and 
candidates closely identified with Islam was both not substantial and did not appear to 
increase during Reformasi.  
 
Measurements: West Sumatra 
The results of West Sumatra’s gubernatorial elections in 2005, 2010 and 2015 
show that the province’s voters have consistently demonstrated their support for 
politicians hailing from Islamic political parties or politicians who had significantly 
utilised religion in their electoral campaigns to win votes. The current West Sumatran 
governor, PKS’ Irwan Prayitno, had won the 2010 and 2015 gubernatorial elections 
with 32% and 59% of the vote respectively (Pemilu.asia, n.d.i; Detik 2010). Although 
Irwan only obtained 32% of the votes in 2010, about 16% of voters chose PAN’s 
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Fauzi Bahar, the other Islamic candidate, which allows for the conclusion that around 
half of the voters in both the 2010 and 2015 elections had voted for an Islamic 
candidate (Detik 2010). 
Similarly, although the 2005 election was won by PDI-P’s Gamawan Fauzi 
with 44% of the vote, it can be argued that Gamawan’s victory was enabled by the 
splitting of the pro-Islamic candidate vote among three losing candidates: PKS’ 
Prayitno who received 25% of the vote, PAN’s Jeffrie Geovanie with 15%, and PPP’s 
Kapitra Ampera with about 7% (Detik 2005a; Detik 2005b). The combined votes of 
this Islamic trio adds up to be about 47%, which is similar to the abovementioned 
share of votes obtained by Islamic candidates in 2010 (49% from two candidates) and 
2015 (59% by one candidate).  
More importantly, it is possible to suggest that electoral support for Prayitno 
could be interpreted as support for an electoral campaign that heavily features Islam. 
Religious issues were prominent in Prayitno’s campaign platform for the 2010 
elections, alongside other ostensibly campaign promises unrelated to Islam. Prayitno 
promised in 2010 that if he were elected, he would turn West Sumatra into an “Islam-
oriented” centre of education and improve the standards of religious education; allow 
for personal piety to develop such as by making it easier for people to worship; build 
more mosques and mushollas; increase the role and functions of religious institutions; 
promote Islamic banking; improve the professionalism of religious groups; and 
promote the religious sciences (Irwan-MK Cagub 2010). 
This heavy focus on Islam in Prayitno’s election agenda is likely in part 
attributable to Prayitno’s background as a leading PKS Islamist ideologue. Prayitno is 
17 
 
a senior PKS official who had previously authored articles exhorting Muslims to 
defend themselves against the ill-intentioned infidels (kafir), such as the Christians 
and the Jews who purportedly sought to destroy the Muslim community 
(menghancurkan umat Islam) by distancing Muslims from the aspiration of 
establishing a caliphate and promoting “nationalism… separation of religion and state, 
orientalism, Christianization, and the women’s liberation movement” (Platzdasch 
2009, 194-195, 350). Prayitno had also authored guidelines for PKS cadres exhorting 
them on the importance of carrying out dakwah in a temperate and “non-
controversial” manner so that dakwah would be more successful (Platzdasch 2009, 
230). 
On the other hand, Islamic political parties have experienced a slight decline in 
their ability to have their politicians elected to the DPR and provincial DPRD in West 
Sumatra during Reformasi. Although Islamic political parties commanded a majority 
of seats in the provincial DPRD legislature from 1999 to 2009, this majority was 
subsequently lost (see Table 3). Similarly, the proportion of DPR legislators elected 
from West Sumatra from Islamic political parties also declined over time during 
Reformasi (see Table 4). 
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Table 3. Provincial Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah legislators from Islamic and 
non-Islamic political parties for West Sumatra from 1999 to 2019 
 Islamic political 
parties 
Non-Islamic political 
parties 
Total 
2015-2019 25 40 65 
2009-2014 20 35 55 
2004-2009 32 23 55 
1999-2004 31 244 55 
Sources: Pemilu.asia, n.d.g; Pemilu.asia, n.d.h; Apriyanto 2007, 71; BPS Sumatera 
Barat 2002, 24. 
 
Table 4. Proportion of Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat legislators from Islamic and non-
Islamic political parties for West Sumatra from 1999 to 2019 
 Islamic political parties Non-Islamic political parties 
2014-2019 36% 64% 
2009-2014 43% 57% 
2004-2009 64% 36% 
1999-2004 57% 43% 
Sources: Pemilu.asia, n.d.e; Pemilu.asia, n.d.f; Apriyanto 2007, 69; KPU 1999, 89. 
 
In summary, it is possible to surmise from these details that to a certain degree 
during Reformasi, a significant portion of West Sumatra’s voters was willing to 
support a politician associated with an Islamic political party and a significantly Islam-
related electoral campaign, as shown by the results of West Sumatra’s gubernatorial 
elections. But at the same time, this support for Islamic politicians is neither on the 
rise nor is it immutable, as shown through the declining fortunes of Islamic political 
parties in West Sumatra during elections for the DPR and the provincial DPRD. Thus, 
with regards to Islamisation in the form of support for political parties and politicians 
                                                 
4 This figure includes six legislators from the police and the military. 
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closely identified with Islam, it is possible to suggest that for West Sumatra while a 
significant number of the province’s voters are Islamised in such a manner to begin 
with, such Islamisation does not appear to have become more widespread during 
Reformasi.  
 
Local Religious Laws and Regulations 
Background and relevance 
 The introduction of religious content in Indonesia’s constitutions, laws and 
regulations has been a long-standing goal for a significant number of Indonesia’s 
Islamic political parties and Islamic groups. The most prominent of such attempts was 
their repeated efforts to insert the Jakarta Charter into Indonesia’s constitution. The 
Jakarta Charter is a seven-word long clause - “dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat 
Islam bagi pemeluknya” - that if inserted, would have constitutionally obliged 
Muslims to adhere to syariah law in Indonesia (Hosen 2005, 419). Although the 
Jakarta Charter was excluded from the final draft of the Indonesian constitution 
ratified in August 1945, Islamic politicians have tried multiple times since then to 
insert the Jakarta Charter, most recently during the period of constitutional reform in 
the early Reformasi years of 1999-2002 (Hosen 2005, 419).  
However, multiple scholars have assessed that the 1999-2002 attempts by 
Islamic politicians to insert the Jakarta Charter or other syariah and religion-related 
clauses into the constitution was actually a non-starter, as the Islamic politicians 
backing these moves (primarily from PPP and PBB) lacked the numbers within the 
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) to have a realistic chance at having these 
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proposed amendments approved (Platzdasch 2009, 176-177; Elson 2013, 420). These 
Islamic politicians were opposed by non-Islamic politicians and some Islamic 
politicians such as PAN leader Amien Rais (Elson 2013, 414-417). There was also 
little public support in favour of these proposed constitutional amendments, which was 
opposed by Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, and prominent Muslim intellectuals 
such as Nurcholish Majid among other parties (Elson 2013, 405, 420). 
Some of these Islamic elements who were less keen on these proposed 
constitutional amendments were not against having syariah, but felt that these 
attempts were detrimental to the pro-syariah cause in different ways. For example, 
some pro-syariah politicians were cognisant that Indonesia lacked the legal 
infrastructure and human resources to properly implement syariah law, and that the 
pro-syariah politicians lobbying for constitutional amendments had not thought 
through how to translate Islamic principles into enforceable codes of law (Platzdasch 
2009, 191-192). Separately, PKS ideologues disagreed with these attempts at 
amending the constitution as they believed that such attempts were bound to fail due 
to insufficient public support for syariah, and furthermore backfire by engendering 
more public resentment against syariah (Platzdasch 2009, 203). Instead, these PKS 
ideologues argued in favour of dakwah programmes to educate the public in favour of 
syariah, while at the same time introducing religious laws into the current legal system 
at a gradual pace, so as to eventually mould society into supporting the imposition of 
an Islamic state ruled by syariah law (Platzdasch 2009, 202-204). 
While it is unclear how many Islamic politicians agreed with the PKS 
ideologues’ slow-boil approach to Islamise Indonesia, the piecemeal introduction of 
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religious laws into Indonesia has taken place in Indonesia during Reformasi. There 
have been successful attempts at legislating religious laws at both the national and 
sub-national levels. At the national level, religious laws concerning marriage, 
education, Islamic banking, the governance of zakat, against insults to religion, and 
the 2008 anti-pornography law which was supported by Islamic parties on a morality 
and anti-vice basis, have been legislated (Salim 2015, 167). 
 At the sub-national level, there has been a burgeoning of religious laws and 
regulations during the Reformasi era. Mainly issued at the provincial, kota, and 
kabupaten levels, these laws and regulations are commonly referred to as Syariah 
regional regulations (perda Syariah) and can be categorised as anti-vice perda Syariah 
(examples of vice are gambling, alcohol consumption, prostitution) and perda Syariah 
in favour of Islam-related activities such as reading the Quran, paying zakat, or 
donning clothing deemed suitable for Muslims (Bush 2008, 174-176).  
These perda Syariah have aroused concern from multiple quarters, such as 
from non-Muslim minorities who fear discrimination, and from women who are 
concerned that their activities are being overly restricted (Bush 2008, 175). Keeping 
track of perda Syariah across Indonesia has been a challenge, resulting in inconsistent 
tallies across the years. Melissa Crouch’s 2009 article on perda Syariah noted that 
there were at least 160 such laws and regulations created between 1999 and 2006 
(Crouch 2009, 54), while a 2010 Human Rights Watch report claimed that there were 
200 perda Syariah in effect at that point in time (HRW 2010). Most recently, Michael 
Buehler’s 2016 book suggested that there were 443 perda Syariah created across 
Indonesia between 1998 and 2013 (Buehler 2016, 174). 
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 As such, this parameter seeks to ascertain the number of perda Syariah that are 
currently in effect in Central Java and West Sumatra, the specific areas of behaviour 
that these perda Syariah seek to control, and the authorities’ ability and consistency in 
enforcing these perda Syariah. This would enable the assessment of the extent of 
Islamisation that has taken place during Reformasi through the usage of perda Syariah 
to rationalise, shape and govern the behaviour of people. 
 
Measurements: Central Java 
 There appears to be relatively few perda Syariah currently in effect in Central 
Java. A November 2018 Tempo article on perda Syariah across Indonesia listed only 
one example from Central Java, which was a Semarang mayoral regulation that sought 
to regulate the hours of operations for entertainment venues such as pubs, public baths, 
billiard parlours, karaoke joints, discotheques, massage parlours, nightclubs, and cafes 
(Siddiq 2018). However, Buehler suggests that there are 17 perda Syariah in Central 
Java, 12 of which were enacted at the district level (kecamatan), and five at the 
municipality level (kabupaten or kota) (Buehler 2016, 215). It is unclear how these 
perda Syariah have been enforced in Central Java, if at all.  
 It is possible that the relative absence of perda Syariah in Central Java is a 
result of both local ambivalence and political opposition against perda Syariah. In 
November 2018, when responding to media queries about a survey that suggested a 
significant portion of Central Java’s population were indifferent towards the 
implementation of perda Syariah in their province, Central Java’s governor Ganjar 
Pranowo told the media that he was against implementing Islam-related laws and 
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regulations in Central Java (JoSS 2018). While it might be tempting to attribute 
Ganjar’s stance to his position as a PDI-P politician, party affiliation with a non-
Islamic party is not a reliable indicator of non-support for perda Syariah. Earlier 
research by the Wahid Foundation had indicated that the perda Syariah issued in 
Indonesia before 2008 was done by politicians from both Islamic and non-Islamic 
political parties, particularly politicians from PKB, Golkar and PDI-P (Bush 2008, 
181). 
 Thus in terms of Islamisation, it would be plausible to suggest that little 
Islamisation has taken place in Central Java during Reformasi in terms of perda 
Syariah as there are probably too few perda Syariah that have been implemented in 
the province to substantially affect the behaviour of its inhabitants. 
 
Measurements: West Sumatra 
 On the other hand, it is clear from prior scholarly accounts that a sizeable 
number of perda Syariah have been both legislated and implemented in West Sumatra 
during the Reformasi era. According to Michael Buehler, 54 perda Syariah were 
created in West Sumatra between 1998 and 2013, which made West Sumatra the 
province with the second-highest number of perda Syariah in Indonesia after West 
Java, which has 103 (Buehler 2016, 174). According to Delmus Puneri Salim, West 
Sumatra’s perda Syariah have primarily dwelt on issues such as regulating behaviour, 
preventing vice and immoral acts, ensuring Quranic literacy including specifically for 
students and couples intending to get married, adopting attire suitable for Muslims, 
and managing zakat (Salim 2015, 167-168).  
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 There are several indicators, mostly from Delmus Puneri Salim’s research, that 
these perda Syariah appear to have been actively implemented by the relevant West 
Sumatran authorities. A religious official from Solok regency told Tempo in 2018 that 
couples who were attempting to get married but were unable to read the Quran would 
have their marriages postponed until they were able to do so (Putri 2018). This penalty 
is in line with the contents of the relevant perda Syariah (Crouch 2009, 74), which in 
this case would be Perda No. 10/2001 Kabupaten dan Kota Solok No. 10/2001 
Tentang Wajib Baca Al-Qur’an untuk Siswa dan Pengantin (Salim 2015, 167). Similar 
perda Syariah exist in the regencies of Sijunjung, Lima Puluh Kota, Pasaman, Pesisir 
Selatan, and Payakumbuh city, but it is unclear how strictly these particular perda 
Syariah have been enforced in these locations (Salim 2015, 167-168). 
 West Sumatra’s perda Syariah requiring Quranic literacy for students have 
been implemented in various ways. In Solok regency, primary school students have 
been required to be able to recite the Quran (Salim 2015, 119). Pesisir Selatan 
regency’s perda Syariah on this issue requires students to perform the salat prayers, in 
addition to possessing Quranic literacy (Salim 2015, 120). For Padang city, public 
secondary school students were required to attend a pengajian at a mosque twice a 
month, and public primary school students had additional Quranic classes every 
Sunday at five a.m. (Salim 2015, 121). In addition, students in Padang were required 
to memorise the 99 names of Allah (Salim 2015, 121). 
 The perda Syariah on zakat were crafted and implemented to strengthen the 
local government’s control over the collection and disbursement of zakat. According 
to Salim, all of West Sumatra’s perda Syariah on zakat stated that the relevant Badan 
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Amil Zakat Daerah officials were responsible for collecting and distributing zakat, as 
opposed to allowing other private institutions to also do so (Salim 2015, 98). In 
addition, Padang city’s zakat law made zakat compulsory for individual Muslims and 
Muslim-owned businesses that could afford it (Salim 2015, 97). The law also specified 
specific assets liable for zakat (gold, silver, cash, business profits, agricultural, 
plantation and fishery products, mining, livestock, income and artefacts) and the 
specific recipients of zakat (the poor, homeless, zakat collectors, those newly 
converted to Islam, slaves, debtors, those engaged in the way of Allah, and wayfarers) 
(Salim 2015, 97-98).  
 The perda Syariah on regulating behaviour and eradicating vice have also been 
enforced, although each locality’s perda Syariah has defined improper behaviour and 
vice differently. The provincial-level anti-vice perda Syariah has specifically 
prohibited adultery, extra-marital sex, gambling, and the consumption of alcohol and 
narcotics (Salim 2015, 149). On the other hand, Padang Panjang city and Padang 
Pariman regency defined vice as “any behaviour displeasing to the community 
because it contravened religious or customary norms”, and Sijunjung regency also 
outlawed any acts that disturbed religious observances (Salim 2015, 149). But there 
are indications that the enforcement of these anti-vice perda Syariah may have been 
sub-optimal. According to bureaucrats and Islamic figures interviewed by Michael 
Buehler, these anti-vice perda Syariah have been ineffectual as their targets have been 
able to bribe governmental officials and local thugs who were tasked by officials to 
enforce these anti-vice perda Syariah (Buehler 2016, 177).   
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 The enforcement of the perda Syariah on adopting Muslim attire appears to 
have led to a visible change in the dressing habits of West Sumatrans. In addition to 
affecting Muslims, non-Muslim women are now generally discouraged from wearing 
clothes that reveal their navel, thighs, or cleavage, even though they are not required to 
wear a jilbab (Salim 2015, 150-151). Some perda Syariah have also gone further in 
specifying what constitutes acceptable dressing, such as Solok regency’s perda 
Syariah which specified the exact type and style of clothing for Muslim men and 
women to wear. Men were obliged to wear trousers and tops with short or long 
sleeves, whereas women were obliged to wear clothes that covered their torso and all 
four limbs, and in addition a jilbab that covered their chest, neck, and head apart from 
the face (Salim 2015, 149). 
 In summary, it is thus plausible to suggest that a significant degree of 
Islamisation has taken place in West Sumatra via perda Syariah during the Reformasi 
era. Apart from the sheer quantity of perda Syariah instituted in the province, it 
appears that these perda Syariah have been enforced sufficiently to substantially 
amend the lifestyle and habits of West Sumatrans to entail a bigger and more 
prominent role of Islam and Islam-related concepts in their daily lives, although this 
assessment should also be caveated as most of the information cited here is derived 
solely from Salim’s study on this issue. 
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Enrolment in Islamic and Non-Islamic Schools 
Background and relevance 
Indonesia’s Islamic education sector is well-developed and extensive. It is 
possible for an Indonesian child to obtain his or her education entirely from Islamic 
schools from pre-school to tertiary education, without having to travel beyond his or 
her home province for the most part (Kemenag RI, n.d.). The majority of Islamic 
schools in Indonesia consist of madrasahs and pesantrens. As of 2007, there were an 
estimated 37,000 madrasahs and 10,000 pesantrens in Indonesia educating at least 5.7 
million students (Azra, Afrianty, and Hefner 2007, 173). 
Pesantrens (generally known as Islamic boarding schools) emerged in 
Indonesia centuries ago to provide a religious education for Indonesia’s Muslims so 
that the latter could perform the duties and rituals that were expected of Muslims 
(Dhofier 1999, 2-4, 13-14). Over time, the focus of pesantrens shifted to training 
would-be traditionalist religious scholars on the Islamic sciences, such as study of the 
Quran and hadith, jurisprudence (fiqh), Arabic grammar, mysticism (tasawwuf), 
rhetoric (balaghah), syntax and morphology (ilmu alat), so that upon returning home 
after graduation, these pesantren graduates could lead and guide their communities on 
religious rituals and religious problems (Azra, Afrianty, and Hefner 2007, 175; 
Dhofier 1999, 30-32).  
Madrasahs were introduced in Indonesia in the early 20th century by 
modernist Muslims that sought to provide a similar education as pesantrens in the 
Islamic sciences, but by using methods of instruction adapted from Dutch government 
schools and Christian missionary schools (Azra, Afrianty, and Hefner 2007, 176). For 
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example, early madrasahs were novel in the local Islamic education scene for 
introducing the modern classroom and blackboard, textbooks, and annual 
examinations, which was a stark contrast to the pesantrens’ relatively loose and 
informal mode of instruction that revolved around the personalised study of the 
classical religious commentaries (kitab kuning) with the resident teacher (kyai) (Azra, 
Afrianty, and Hefner 2007, 176). 
Government-led reforms in the 1970s would play a significant role in bringing 
both pesantrens and madrasahs closer to the current system today. In the 1970s, the 
religion ministry standardised madrasahs into three separate levels of graded 
instruction that were aligned with similar categories of non-Islamic schools at the 
same level: the Madrasah Ibtidaiyah (MI) and the non-Islamic Sekolah Dasar (SD) at 
the primary school level, the Madrasah Tsanwiyah (MT) and its counterpart Sekolah 
Menengah Pertama (SMP) at the lower secondary level, and Madrasah Aliyah (MA) 
and its counterpart Sekolah Menengah Atas (SMA) at the upper secondary level (Azra, 
Afrianty, and Hefner 2007, 177). 
As for pesantrens, a 1975 government regulation made it compulsory for 
pesantren students to complete a general elementary education of at least six years in 
addition to their religious studies, although scholars have noted that many pesantrens 
were by the 1950s offering non-religious subjects such as English and mathematics to 
attract students interested in working in secular occupations after graduation (Azra, 
Afrianty, and Hefner 2007, 176; Hefner 2009, 65; Dhofier 1999, 22). Nevertheless, 
pesantrens remain distinct from both non-Islamic schools and madrasahs in some 
aspects. Unlike madrasahs and non-Islamic schools, pesantrens do not follow the 
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standardised Indonesian academic year, and pesantren curriculums are also not 
standardised in any manner (OECD and ADB 2015, 70).  
Recent scholarship suggests that many graduates of madrasahs and pesantrens 
are still commonly found in local communities as mosque leaders (imam), religious 
teachers (ustadz), or even as religious scholars (ulama) if the graduate pursues 
additional studies elsewhere (Hefner 2009, 60-61; Asadullah and Maliki 2018, 98). 
This thesis is primarily concerned with ascertaining the popularity of Islamic 
education in Central Java and West Sumatra during Reformasi, as I define this aspect 
of Islamisation as the extent to which an Islamic education is deemed desirable and 
worth obtaining. Thus I will attempt to measure this aspect of Islamisation by 
examining enrolment figures for madrasahs and pesantrens in Central Java and West 
Sumatra during Reformasi vis-à-vis enrolment figures for their public school 
counterparts. 
However, I am aware that religion-related reasons are unlikely to be the sole 
factor behind a decision to enrol into an Islamic school. As highlighted by Karen 
Bryner’s 2009 fieldwork in Yogyakarta, both students and parents expressed a variety 
of reasons for wanting to enrol in an Islamic school, both religious (improving one’s 
Arabic, understanding Islam better, acquiring morals) and non-religious (joining a 
sibling already enrolled there) (Bryner 2009, 142-149).  
Money-related factors are also an important criterion behind the choice of 
schools. According to a 2018 study by Niaz Asadullah and Maliki, parents that opted 
to send their children to non-Islamic schools were found to be generally more literate, 
urban, richer and better educated, thus allowing Asadullah and Maliki to hypothesise 
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that the lower fees in Islamic schools was an important factor that convinced some 
parents to enrol their children there (Asadullah and Maliki 2018, 106). The soundness 
of Asadullah and Maliki’s hypothesis arises from the general fact that cost-related 
considerations are a major factor influencing enrolment rates, or the lack thereof in the 
Indonesian education system (ASEAN 2014, 51). For example, pesantrens are known 
to be popular as a low-cost means for children from poorer backgrounds to obtain an 
education (ASEAN 2014, 49). In general, during Reformasi, while almost all children 
attended primary school, around a quarter of school-age children did not enrol at the 
lower secondary level, and only around half of school-age children enrolled in upper 
secondary school (ASEAN 2014, 45). These decreased enrolment rates at higher levels 
of education are likely due to a combination of increased fees and costs at the junior 
secondary and upper secondary level in the form of textbooks, consumables, school 
uniforms, transportation, school registration and meals, and also the potential 
opportunity cost in the form of the potential earnings these teenagers could obtain if 
they were to enter the workforce earlier (OECD and ADB 2015, 70). 
At the same time, there is also the possibility that individuals may seek an 
Islamic education to qualify for specific lucrative job opportunities. A senior Islamic 
educator in East Java told Robert Hefner in 2005 that job opportunities as preachers 
were flourishing for those trained in religious knowledge and Arabic, and that a gifted 
preacher could earn more in one night than an Islamic judge or teacher could in a 
month (Hefner 2009, 69). 
Thus in acknowledgment of the multitude of possible reasons that constitute an 
individual’s choice for an Islamic or non-Islamic education, I will exercise caution 
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when characterising the degree of assessed Islamisation from the enrolment figures of 
Central Java and West Sumatra.   
 
Measurements: Central Java 
 There appears to be a statistically significant increase in the number of students 
enrolled in Islamic schools at the primary level, known as Madrasah Ibtidaiyah (MI), 
during Reformasi as demonstrated by the trendline in Figure 1. From 2002-2017, the 
yearly enrolment figures for MI had steadily increased from around 531,000 students 
in 2002 to 611,000 students in 2017, an increase of around 15% (see Figure 1). It is 
plausible that this increase may in part have come at the expense of enrolment at its 
non-Islamic counterpart, Sekolah Dasar (SD). As demonstrated by the negative 
trendline in Figure 2, the yearly enrolment figures for SD had steadily declined from 
3.57 million in 2002 to 2.98 million in 2017, a decrease of around 17%.  
 
Figure 1. Enrolment in Madrasah Ibtidiyah for Central Java from 2002 to 2017 (‘000). 
Sources: BPS Jawa Tengah 2018, 88; BPS Jawa Tengah 2017, 86; BPS Jawa Tengah 
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2016, 77; BPS Jawa Tengah 2015, 95; BPS Jawa Tengah 2010, 109; BPS Jawa 
Tengah 2006, 109.  
 
 
Figure 2. Enrolment in Sekolah Dasar for Central Java from 2002 to 2017 (‘000). 
Sources: BPS Jawa Tengah 2018, 87; BPS Jawa Tengah 2017, 85; BPS Jawa Tengah 
2016, 76; BPS Jawa Tengah 2015, 92; BPS Jawa Tengah 2010, 106; BPS Jawa 
Tengah 2006, 106.  
 
At the lower secondary level, there has also been a similar statistically 
significant increase in the number of students attending Islamic schools, known as 
Madrasah Tsanwiyah (MT). From 2000 to 2017, the yearly enrolment figures for MT 
had substantially increased from around 314,000 students in 2000 to 426,000 students 
in 2017, an increase of around 35% (see Figure 3). This also may have come at the 
expense of enrolment figures at its non-Islamic counterpart, Sekolah Menengah 
Pertama (SMP), whose enrolment appears to have increased at a slightly slower rate 
compared to MT, as shown by the SMP trendline in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3. Enrolment in Madrasah Tsanwiyah and Sekolah Menengah Pertama for 
Central Java from 2000 to 2017 (‘000). Sources: BPS Jawa Tengah 2018, 89-90; BPS 
Jawa Tengah 2017, 87-88; BPS Jawa Tengah 2016, 78-79; BPS Jawa Tengah 2015, 
96, 99; BPS Jawa Tengah 2010, 110, 113; BPS Jawa Tengah 2006, 110, 113; BPS 
Jawa Tengah 2001, 143, 146. 
 
Enrolment at the Islamic schools for the upper secondary level, Madrasah 
Aliyah (MA) also increased during Reformasi, as demonstrated by the trendline in 
Figure 4. From 2000 to 2015, yearly enrolment in MA had steadily increased from 
80,000 in 2000 to 147,000 in 2015, an increase of around 83%. However, this increase 
did not appear to have come at the expense of enrolment in the non-Islamic schools at 
the same level, the Sekolah Menengah Atas (SMA) and Sekolah Menengah Kejuruan 
(SMK).5 In fact, enrolment at SMA and SMK increased more significantly than 
enrolment at MA during the 2000-2015 period. Enrolment at SMA and SMK 
                                                 
5 Apart from choosing between MA and SMA, students can also choose to 
attend SMK, which provides a vocational education. There is an Islamic version of 
SMK known as Madrasah Aliyah Kejuruan (MAK). But there are no separate 
enrolment statistics for MAK as it appears that MAK students attend MA institutions 
where they study a vocational curriculum (IES, n.d.). 
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increased from 762,000 in 2000 to 1.01 million in 2015 (see Figure 4), an increase of 
about 248,000 students enrolled compared to a 67,000 increase for MA.  
 
Figure 4. Enrolment in Madrasah Aliyah, Sekolah Menengah Atas, and Sekolah 
Menengah Kejuruan for Central Java from 2000 to 2015 (‘000). It is unclear why 
enrolment in 2008 drastically dipped, though the 2007-2008 global financial crisis 
might be one possible explanation. Sources: BPS Jawa Tengah 2015, 100, 103; BPS 
Jawa Tengah 2010, 114, 117; BPS Jawa Tengah 2006, 114, 117; BPS Jawa Tengah 
2001, 147, 150. 
 
There was also a significant statistical increase in the yearly enrolment figures 
in Central Java’s pesantrens during Reformasi. The yearly enrolment figure in 2016 
was 657,000, which was almost three times as large as the enrolment figure of 223,000 
in 1998 (see Figure 5).  
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Figure 5. Enrolment in pesantrens for Central Java from 1998 to 2016 (‘000). 
Sources: Kemenag RI 2017, 163; BPS Jawa Tengah 2015, 118; BPS Jawa Tengah 
2014, 148; BPS Jawa Tengah 2013, 148; BPS Jawa Tengah 2010, 150; BPS Jawa 
Tengah 2005, 152; BPS Jawa Tengah 2001, 182. 
 
In summary, the statistics for Central Java appear to tentatively suggest the 
presence of Islamisation during Reformasi in the form of a more receptive attitude 
towards Islamic education in Central Java. Across all levels of education measured, 
there was a statistically significant increase in preference for Islamic education that 
took place alongside relatively lower increases or even a decrease in preferences for 
non-Islamic schools, except in the case of upper secondary education. But this 
hypothesis of possible Islamisation should be caveated by the possibility that these 
increases in enrolment could also have been partly induced by other non-religious 
factors as discussed earlier. In addition, for Central Java’s case, the increase in upper 
secondary enrolment for both SMA and MA can also be partly explained by the 
provision of financial assistance from both the national and provincial governments 
36 
 
(Suwardi 2018, “SMK Gratis”). Thus while still plausibly valid, the Islamisation-
related conclusions drawn from these observations should not be overstated. 
 
Measurements: West Sumatra 
 There was a statistically significant increase in enrolment in Madrasah 
Ibtidiyah (MI) at the primary school level during Reformasi. The yearly enrolment in 
MI in 2017 was 21,000, almost double of the 1998 figure of around 11,000 (see Figure 
6). However, the significance of this increase in MI enrolment is diminished given that 
the majority of relevant school-age children continue to be enrolled in Sekolah Dasar 
(SD), with yearly enrolment ratios between SD and MI ranging from 30:1 to 55:1 
during this 1998-2018 period (see Figures 6 and 7). In addition, enrolment in SD also 
generally increased during this time period, as shown by the trendline in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 6. Enrolment in Madrasah Ibtidiyah for West Sumatra from 1998 to 2017 
(‘000). Sources: BPS Sumatera Barat 2018, 238; BPS Sumatera Barat 2013, 144; BPS 
Sumatera Barat 2008, 106; BPS Sumatera Barat 2002, 80. 
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Figure 7. Enrolment in Sekolah Dasar for West Sumatra from 1998 to 2017 (‘000). 
Source: BPS Sumatera Barat 2018, 234; BPS Sumatera Barat 2013, 129; BPS 
Sumatera Barat 2008, 92; BPS Sumatera Barat 2002, 68. 
 
At the lower secondary level, statistically significant increases in enrolment for 
both Madrasah Tsanwiyah (MT) and Sekolah Menengah Pertama (SMP) between 
1998 to 2007 can be discerned. For example, the yearly enrolment at MT for 2017 was 
around 85,000, compared to around 54,000 in 1998 (see Figure 8). Similar gross 
increases in enrolment took place for SMP, where the yearly enrolment in 2017 was 
218,000, compared to around 188,000 in 1998 (see Figure 8). 
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Figure 8. Enrolment in Madrasah Tsanwiyah and Sekolah Menengah Pertama for 
West Sumatra from 1998 to 2017 (‘000). Sources: BPS Sumatera Barat 2018, 242, 
246; BPS Sumatera Barat 2013, 132, 147; BPS Sumatera Barat 2008, 95, 108; BPS 
Sumatera Barat 2002, 70, 82. 
 
There was also a statistically significant increase in enrolment at Madrasah 
Aliyah (MA) between 1998 and 2017, as suggested by the trendline in Figure 9. The 
yearly enrolment for MA in 2017 was around 30,000, compared to around 17,000 in 
1998 (see Figure 9). However, this increase in MA enrolment was dwarfed by the 
increase in enrolment in Sekolah Menengah Atas (SMA) and Sekolah Menengah 
Kejuruan (SMK) during the same time period in terms of gross increases. The yearly 
enrolment in SMA and SMK in 2017 was around 231,000, compared to 146,000 in 
1998 (see Figure 9). 
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Figure 9. Enrolment in Madrasah Aliyah, Sekolah Menengah Atas, and Sekolah 
Menengah Kejuruan for West Sumatra from 1998 to 2017 (‘000). Source: BPS 
Sumatera Barat 2018, 254, 262; BPS Sumatera Barat 2013, 141, 150; BPS Sumatera 
Barat 2008, 98, 110; BPS Sumatera Barat 2002, 73, 84. 
  
As for pesantrens, the trendline in Figure 10 suggests a slight statistically 
significant increase in yearly enrolment between 2008 to 2017. At the same time, these 
yearly enrolment figures fluctuated significantly between 2008 and 2017 (see Figure 
10). While enrolment figures dipped to a low of 19,000 in 2012 and peaked at 39,000 
in 2015, these figures started and ended the time period without much difference at 
32,000 for 2008 and 30,000 in 2017 (see Figure 10). 
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Figure 10. Enrolment in pesantrens for West Sumatra from 2008 to 2017 (‘000). 
Source: BPS Sumatera Barat 2018, 310; BPS Sumatera Barat 2013, 195. 
 
In summary, it is possible to suggest that Islamisation might have manifested 
in West Sumatra during Reformasi in the form of an increased preference for an 
Islamic education, although such an assessment would have to be heavily qualified. 
There were statistically significant increases in the yearly enrolment figures at all 
levels of Islamic schools, but yearly enrolment figures in non-Islamic schools at the 
same level during the same time period were either equally or more significant than 
the increases for Islamic schools. It is possible that the proliferation of perda Syariah 
in West Sumatra requiring Quranic literacy for all students in the province may have 
relatively lowered the demand for Islamic schools, as it would be possible for students 
to obtain some religious education without having to enrol in an Islamic school.   
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Muslim Places of Worship 
Background and relevance 
Scholars have suggested that the construction of Muslim places of worship 
could be used to measure religiosity in communities. Some studies have documented 
instances where mosque construction was perceived as attempts to proliferate the 
physical symbols of Islam within the community, presumably out of a sense of piety 
(Gutiérrez 2015, 1-2; Kuppinger 2014, 794-795). A 2017 article by Nick Kuipers 
suggested that the act of constructing mosques and mushollas in Indonesia was an 
indicator of religiosity as these construction efforts were usually organised by the local 
community for their own needs (Kuipers 2017). This was because since 2006, permits 
for constructing places of worship in Indonesia have been granted by lower-level local 
officials, whereas previously such permits were granted by the regent (bupati) or 
mayor (walikota) (Kuipers 2017).  
Most of the mosques and mushollas in Indonesia constructed during Reformasi 
are likely to be funded by local sources. Kuipers noted that while communities had 
previously received funding from the national government during the Orde Baru to 
build mosques, such funding had largely dried up during Reformasi due to fiscal 
decentralisation (Kuipers 2017). Moreover, sources of external funding for building 
mosques, including from Saudi Arabia, are likely to be limited. As of 2017, only an 
estimated 150 out of Indonesia’s 800,000 mosques and mushollas were Saudi-funded 
(Varagur 2017; Kuipers 2017). 
I seek to build on this existing research by ascertaining the extent of Islamisation 
that has taken place during Reformasi in the form of mosque and musholla-building. 
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Assuming that the religiosity of local communities was a key reason for building 
mosques or mushollas, I will do so by collating Indonesian government statistics on the 
yearly recorded number of mosques and mushollas in Central Java and West Sumatra. 
I will also ascertain whether population increases may have been a reason for building 
more mosques and mushollas.  
 
Measurements: Central Java 
There was a steady increase in the number of mosques in Central Java between 
2003 to 2017 as demonstrated by the trendline in Figure 11.6 During this time period, 
the number of mosques had increased from 36,000 in 2003 to 47,000 in 2017 (see 
Figure 11). There was only a slight increase in the number of mushollas during the 
same time period, from 94,342 in 2003 to 95,662 in 2017 (BPS Jawa Tengah 2018, 
126; BPS Jawa Tengah 2004, 153).  
                                                 
 6 The fluctuations in Figures 11 to 14 for mosque numbers are likely due to 
inadequate attempts by officials to keep track of these places of worship. This 
anecdote from Kuipers illustrates the difficulty of doing so. In recent years, 
Indonesia’s religious affairs ministry had solicited its mosques and mushollas to fill 
out a form for the ministry’s national database, but only 423,000 out of the country’s 
800,000 mosques and mushollas had done so thus far (Kuipers 2017). 
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Figure 11. Number of mosques in Central Java from 2003 to 2017. Sources: BPS Jawa 
Tengah 2018, 126; BPS Jawa Tengah 2017, 124; BPS Jawa Tengah 2016, 97; BPS 
Jawa Tengah 2015, 117; BPS Jawa Tengah 2010, 149; BPS Jawa Tengah 2007, 149; 
BPS Jawa Tengah 2006, 149; BPS Jawa Tengah 2005, 151; BPS Jawa Tengah 2004, 
153.  
 
This increase in mosques appears to have outpaced the population growth of 
Muslims in the province. The ratio of Muslims to mosques in Central Java has 
generally decreased between 2003 to 2017, as depicted by the trendline in Figure 12. 
This trend is also borne out by census data, which indicated that the Muslim 
population in Central Java had only increased by about 5% between 2000 and 2010 
(Indiyanto 2013, 25), when the number of mosques had increased by about 14% 
during the same time period.7   
                                                 
7 In view of the implausible fluctuation in the number of mosques recorded for 
2010, I have used the average number of mosques between 2008 to 2012 (which is 
40140.8) to derive this 14% figure. 
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Figure 12. Number of Muslims per mosques for Central Java from 2003 to 2017. 
Population statistics before 2015 are interpolated using census data from 2000 and 
2010. Sources: BPS Jawa Tengah 2018, 53, 125-126; BPS Jawa Tengah 2017, 123-
124; BPS Jawa Tengah 2016, 96-97; BPS Jawa Tengah 2015, 116-117; BPS Jawa 
Tengah 2010, 148-149; BPS Jawa Tengah 2007, 149; BPS Jawa Tengah 2006, 149; 
BPS Jawa Tengah 2005, 151; BPS Jawa Tengah 2004, 153.  
 
In summary, the higher number of mosques in Central Java seems to indicate a 
higher degree of Islamisation during Reformasi in the form of increased building of 
mosques, especially since it is likely that more mosques were built than what was 
necessary to cater for the increase in population. It is also peculiar that there was no 
equivalent increase in the number of mushollas similar to that of mosques, which 
would have been necessary if the new mosques were built to service a growing 
population. Thus there are grounds to surface the hypothesis that this increased 
mosque-building in Central Java may reflect various forms of increased religiosity 
among its Muslims, be it via visiting the mosque more often, or wanting to build more 
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mosques, or to have separate mosques for a specific sub-denomination of Islam, such 
as Salafism. 
 
Measurements: West Sumatra 
 There was also a steady increase in the number of mosques in West Sumatra 
during Reformasi as demonstrated by the trendline in Figure 13. During this time 
period, the number of mosques had increased from about 4,000 in 1998 to 5,000 in 
2017 (see Figure 13). There was no significant change in the number of mushollas in 
West Sumatra between 1998 and 2007, which averaged around 11,000 to 12,000 
during this time (BPS Sumatera Barat 2018, 299; BPS Sumatera Barat 2002, 130).  
 
Figure 13. Number of mosques in West Sumatra from 1998 to 2017. Sources: BPS 
Sumatera Barat 2018, 299; BPS Sumatera Barat 2013, 187; BPS Sumatera Barat 2008, 
158; BPS Sumatera Barat 2002, 130. 
 
However, this increase in the number of mosques did not outpace the 
population growth of Muslims in West Sumatra. As shown by the trendline in Figure 
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14, the number of Muslims per mosque for West Sumatra has generally increased 
between 2003 to 2017, as depicted by the trendline in Figure 14.  
 
Figure 14. Number of Muslims per mosque for West Sumatra from 1998 to 2017. 
Population statistics for 1998, 1999, 2001 to 2003, and 2006 are interpolated using 
census data and statistics from Badan Pusat Statistik. Sources: BPS Sumatera Barat 
2018, 173, 298-299; BPS Sumatera Barat 2015, 199; BPS Sumatera Barat 2013, 187; 
BPS Sumatera Barat 2010, 61, 158; BPS Sumatera Barat 2009, 61, 155; BPS 
Sumatera Barat 2008, 65, 158-159; BPS Sumatera Barat 2006, 57, 147; BPS Sumatera 
Barat 2005, 147; BPS Sumatera Barat 2002, 130; Indiyanto 2013, 25.  
 
It is possible that Islamisation might have taken place in West Sumatra in the 
form of mosque-building efforts during Reformasi. The main factor in favour of 
Islamisation would be the substantial 25% increase in the number of mosques during 
Reformasi. As with the analysis for Central Java, it is also peculiar that in West 
Sumatra, there was no equivalent increase in the number of mushollas similar to that 
of mosques, which would have been necessary if the new mosques were built to 
service a growing population. While the increased ratio of Muslims to mosques during 
Reformasi appears to suggest that insufficient mosques were built to cater for 
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population increases, such a conclusion would require measurements of mosque 
capacity and accessibility across West Sumatra, an effort that is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. Thus as with the case in Central Java, it remains tentatively plausible that 
the increased mosque-building in West Sumatra is reflective of a possible increase in 
religiosity among its Muslims. 
 
Religion-related intolerance 
Background and relevance 
 Much has been written by scholars about an apparent rise in religion-related 
intolerance by Muslims in Indonesia during the Reformasi era. Kikue Hamayotsu has 
argued that the lack of social mobility for many Muslims during the New Order 
regime had resulted in some of these Muslims believing that this was due to 
discrimination by non-Muslims within the government (particularly by the Chinese), 
and such beliefs had helped instigate the religion-based communal violence during the 
early years of Reformasi (Hamayotsu 2002, 371-372). This communal violence during 
the early Reformasi years mainly took place in the forms of numerous attacks against 
non-Muslim minorities in Java and Sumatra (Sidel 2006, 135-137), widespread 
Muslim-Christian clashes in Central Sulawesi, Maluku and North Maluku (Sidel 2006, 
153-187), and the emergence of Islamic vigilante groups, most notably the Front 
Pembela Islam (FPI) (Sidel 2006, 137-140). 
While the large-scale clashes in Sulawesi and the Malukus had ceased by late 
2001, small-scale violence has persisted in an intermittent fashion across Indonesia. 
According to Marcus Mietzner, since 2005, local militias have been responsible for 
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small-scale but increasingly violent attacks on religious minorities and Islamic sects 
deemed unorthodox by their attackers (Mietzner 2014, 53).  
Some scholars have identified how Indonesian bureaucrats have been complicit 
in encouraging religious intolerance during Reformasi. Officials from the Majelis 
Ulama Indonesia (MUI), Indonesia’s top clerical body, were said to have encouraged 
violence from religious intolerance by engaging in public discourse that allows these 
perpetrators of communal violence to frame their actions as being in defence of 
Indonesia and Islam (Woodward et al. 2014, 155). There have also been instances of 
MUI officials and other local officials directly engaging in persecution of religious 
minorities deemed as residing outside the five state-permitted religions in Indonesia 
(Hicks 2013, 10-13). 
One frequent area of dispute has been over the establishment and operation of 
non-Muslim places of worship. Some Muslim groups including the FPI have forcibly 
closed multiple churches across Indonesia in recent decades and pressured local 
officials to reject applications to build new churches (USCIRF 2013, 1). In 2017, 
Muslims protesting the erection of a 30-meter-tall statue of Guan Yu (a general in 
third century China that is a figure of worship for various Chinese religions) outside a 
Confucian temple in Tuban, East Java argued that the statue was an insult to Islam and 
the “natives” of the region (Goldman 2017). 
Another common target for violence and discrimination are Muslim minorities 
deemed unorthodox by Indonesia’s Sunni majority, such as Indonesia’s Shia and 
Ahmadiyah communities. Scholars have observed an upsurge of anti-Shia and anti-
Ahmadiyah violence during Reformasi, such as forcing Shia residents to leave the 
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community unless they converted to Sunnism (Suryana 2018, 148, 151-152), and mob 
violence against Ahmadiyah practitioners including instances where local police 
officers were present but had refused to intervene (Woodward et al. 2014, 167-168).  
These acts of anti-Shia and anti-Ahmadiyah violence have been in part 
legitimised and encouraged by religious authorities, including MUI. In 2005, MUI had 
re-issued its 1980 fatwa declaring Ahmadiyah teachings as heretical for suggesting 
that its founder was a prophet (Woodward et al. 2014, 158). Both local MUI officials 
and the police were involved in the successful persecution of a Shia preacher in East 
Java between 2011 to 2012, that culminated in East Java’s governor issuing a decree 
against religious deviancy that included Shia Islam as a target (Formichi 2014, 22-23). 
In 2013, local religious leaders in East Java had rejected President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono’s request to allow evicted Shia families to return without being forced to 
convert to Sunni Islam (Suryana 2018, 151-152). 
There are grounds to suspect that such sentiments may not necessarily be 
isolated within a noisy fringe. A 2018 article by Marcus Mietzner and Burhanuddin 
Muhtadi suggested that the FPI and other like-minded Muslim groups were supported 
by a like-minded and significant segment of Indonesian Muslims who were 
conservative, pro-Islamist and politically neglected, and this enabled the FPI and these 
Muslim groups to mobilise 200,000 to half a million Indonesians to protest in Jakarta 
in late 2016 against the alleged insults against Islam committed by the then Jakarta 
governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Mietzner and Muhtadi 2018, 479, 493-495). 
 This thesis considers all religiously-motivated intolerance by Muslims against 
non-Muslims or other Muslims as another aspect of Islamisation and seeks to measure 
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its prevalence during Reformasi in Central Java and West Sumatra through statistics of 
instances of religiously-motivated intolerance, and the number of non-Muslim places 
of worship in the province over time. Through the measurements obtained, an 
assessment can be derived on the state of Islamisation in these two provinces, as 
defined by the suspected prevalence and influence of intolerant Muslims who are 
willing and able to act on their beliefs. 
 
Measurements: Central Java 
According to the Wahid Foundation’s records, the number of incidents of 
religiously-motivated intolerance8 per year in Central Java had fluctuated between 
2008 to 2017. These incidents had steadily risen from four incidents in 2008 to peak at 
45 incidents in 2012, before subsiding back to around 11 incidents per year between 
2014 to 2017 (see Table 5).  
Table 5. Incidents of intolerance in Central Java from 2008 to 2017 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Number of 
incidents 
2 16 4 19 45 30 10 7 14 15 
Sources: Wahid Foundation 2018, 16; Wahid Foundation n.d., 8; Wahid Foundation 
2015, 27; Wahid Foundation 2014b, 25-26; Wahid Foundation 2014a, 23-24; Wahid 
Foundation 2012, 29, 33-34; Wahid Foundation 2011, 4-5; Wahid Foundation 2010, 
38, 50, 62, 71; Wahid Foundation 2009, 4; Wahid Foundation 2008, 84, 89.  
 
This suggestion of increased religious tolerance in Central Java in recent years 
appears to be echoed in part by the Setara Institute’s findings.  According to the Setara 
                                                 
8 These incidents of religiously-motivated intolerance would include both 
violent and non-violent acts that violate religious freedom, ranging from hate speech 
and physical harassment, to systematic exclusion and violent repression (Wahid 
Foundation 2015, 17-24). 
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Institute’s annual evaluation and ranking of Indonesian cities in terms of assessed 
tolerance9, the Central Java city of Salatiga was among the top 10 most tolerant cities 
for both the 2017 and the 2018 rankings, while no Central Java cities were in the 
bottom ten (Setara Institute 2017; Setara Institute 2018, 5-8). 
At the same time, governmental statistics suggest that there has been a 
discernible increase in the number of non-Muslim places of worship in Central Java 
from 2001 to 2017, from around 3,000 in 2001 to around 4,000 in 2017, a substantial 
increase given the extremely low proportion of non-Muslims in Central Java (BPS 
Jawa Tengah 2018, 126; BPS Jawa Tengah 2004, 153).  
In summary, these measurements appear to suggest that despite the occasional 
presence of religiously-motivated intolerance in Central Java, it is possible to consider 
the province as relatively religiously tolerant, thus in turn the level of Islamisation in 
Central Java in this regard can be regarded as relatively low. 
 
Measurements: West Sumatra 
 According to the Wahid Foundation’s records, there were few incidents of 
religious intolerance in West Sumatra between 2008 and 2017 (see Table 6). But more 
recent reporting by the Setara Institute suggests that intolerance might be prevalent 
within parts of West Sumatra, particularly Padang city. The Setara Institute had listed 
                                                 
9 Each city was scored on four aspects: 1) the presence of local governmental 
policies promoting or discouraging tolerance; 2) statements and actions by local 
officials regarding tolerance; 3) instances and dynamics of religious intolerance in 
local communities; and 4) the diversity and inclusivity of local communities. These 
cities were then ranked against each other based on their total score, from which the 
annual ranking was derived (Setara Institute 2018, 3-5). 
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Padang city as one of the top 10 most intolerant Indonesian cities for both 2017 and 
2018 (Setara Institute 2017; Setara Institute 2018, 6-7). In view of the methodology 
used by the Setara Institute for calculating its rankings, this would suggest that there 
might have been substantial incidences of religious-related intolerance taking place in 
Padang in recent years and that Padang’s officials did not act to clamp down against 
such incidents (Setara Institute 2018, 3-5). 
Table 6. Incidents of intolerance in West Sumatra from 2008 to 2017 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Number 
of 
incidents 
0 3 0 3 4 1 1 1 8 0 
Sources: Wahid Foundation 2018, 16; Wahid Foundation n.d., 8; Wahid Foundation 
2015, 27; Wahid Foundation 2014b, 25-26; Wahid Foundation 2014a, 23-24; Wahid 
Foundation 2012, 29, 33-34; Wahid Foundation 2011, 4-5; Wahid Foundation 2010, 
38, 50, 62, 71; Wahid Foundation 2009, 4; Wahid Foundation 2008, 84, 89.  
 
 Governmental statistics also suggest that the number of non-Muslim places of 
worship in West Sumatra during Reformasi have remained consistent at around 400, 
with little growth if any (BPS Sumatera Barat 2018, 299; BPS Sumatera Barat 2002, 
130).  
 While incidents of intolerance do not appear to be common in West Sumatra, 
these findings do suggest possible areas of concern that warrant further investigation. 
For example, it is possible to hypothesise that there might have been underreporting of 
incidents of intolerance, when attempting to reconcile the low number of such 
incidents recorded by the Wahid Foundation with the Setara Institute’s assessment of 
Padang city as an intolerant city. It is also peculiar that the number of non-Muslim 
places of worship in West Sumatra has remained stagnant over a period of 20 years, 
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especially when considering that there was an increase in non-Muslim places of 
worship in Central Java, a province that also has a very low number of non-Muslims. 
Thus this suggests there might have been obstruction of attempts to construct or obtain 
official permits for non-Muslim places of worship in West Sumatra. As such, there are 
grounds for this thesis to suggest that Islamisation might have occurred in West 
Sumatra in the form of religiously-motivated intolerance.  
 
Hajj Pilgrimage and Qurban 
Background and relevance 
 This thesis considers personal piety as an important aspect of Islamisation, as it 
is possible to theoretically regard individual piety as a primary motive that compels 
the individual to perform other visible acts of Islamisation. Earlier scholarly attempts 
at measuring piety had identified the performance of religious rituals that were 
expected from adherents of the religion as acts of piety. For example, a recent study by 
Thomas Pepinsky, William Liddle and Saiful Mujani sought to measure piety by 
surveying Indonesian Muslims on whether they performed the obligatory daily 
prayers, fasted during Ramadan, attended Friday prayers, and paid zakat after 
Ramadan among other religious acts (Pepinksy, Liddle, and Mujani 2018, 33-36).  
Building upon such studies, I will use statistics on participation in the hajj 
pilgrimage for both Central Java and West Sumatra, and participation in religious 
rituals during Qurban (the Indonesian name for the Eid al-Adha holiday) for West 
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Sumatra10 to assess the general levels of piety within these two provinces as an aspect 
of Islamisation. 
 
Measurements: Central Java 
 In Central Java, the number of Muslims performing the hajj pilgrimage each 
year had increased significantly during Reformasi, both in absolute terms and as a 
proportion of the Muslim population. Yearly pilgrim numbers had increased steadily 
from 18,000 pilgrims in 1998, to 32,000 pilgrims in 2017 (see Figure 15). This 
significant increase in pilgrim numbers remained after population growth during this 
period was accounted for, as indicated by the trendline in Figure 16. The steep drop in 
pilgrim numbers in 1999 is possibly attributable to the combination of the financial 
crisis and political transition that Indonesia was undergoing at that time.  
 
Figure 15. Number of pilgrims from Central Java for 1998 to 2017. Sources:  BPS 
Jawa Tengah 2018, 127; BPS Jawa Tengah 2015, 117-119; BPS Jawa Tengah 2010, 
                                                 
10 The relevant Qurban-related statistics are unavailable for Central Java. 
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149, 151; BPS Jawa Tengah 2007, 149; BPS Jawa Tengah 2005, 153; BPS Jawa 
Tengah 2002, 172; Kemenag RI 2017, 73. 
 
 
Figure 16. Number of pilgrims relative to Muslim population for Central Java from 
1998 to 2017. Population statistics before 2015 are interpolated using census data from 
2000 and 2010. Sources: BPS Jawa Tengah 2018, 53, 125, 127; BPS Jawa Tengah 
2017, 123; BPS Jawa Tengah 2016, 96; BPS Jawa Tengah 2015, 116-117, 119; BPS 
Jawa Tengah 2010, 148-151; BPS Jawa Tengah 2007, 149; BPS Jawa Tengah 2005, 
151-153; BPS Jawa Tengah 2004, 153; BPS Jawa Tengah 2002, 172; Kemenag RI 
2017, 73.  
 
These pilgrims had probably waited for a long time for their turn to perform 
the hajj. A senior religious affairs official in Central Java in charge of hajj-related 
issues told the media in July 2018 that hajj applicants from Central Java were on a 
waiting list that could take as long as 21 years (The Jakarta Post 2018). In addition, it 
appears that Central Java’s hajj waiting list had only lengthened in recent years.11 An 
earlier 2015 media report claimed that the waiting list across Indonesia only ranged 
                                                 
11 It is unclear how Indonesia’s hajj authorities allocate Indonesia’s yearly 
national hajj quota among the different waiting lists at the local level. 
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from 12 to 17 years (Soloway 2015). In addition, these aspiring pilgrims had paid at 
least US$2,000 to join the waiting list (Soloway 2015). It is thus plausible that the 
lengthened waiting list is indicative of increased piety among Muslims in the province, 
given that hajj applicants there are paying a significant sum of money for an event that 
they could only attend two decades later.  
In summary, it is plausible to suggest that there was an increase in Islamisation 
in Central Java during Reformasi, in terms of piety demonstrated by what appears to 
be increased enthusiasm for performing the hajj.   
 
Measurements: West Sumatra 
 In West Sumatra, the number of Muslims performing the hajj pilgrimage each 
year remained largely similar during the Reformasi period. Apart from a steep 
decrease in pilgrim numbers in 1999 that was likely attributable to the political and 
economic instability in Indonesia then (similar to what happened in Central Java), 
pilgrim numbers from West Sumatra generally fluctuated between around 3,600 to 
4,600 between 1998 to 2017 (see Figure 17). Thus after accounting for population 
growth during Reformasi, this resulted in a small decline in the yearly proportion of 
Muslims performing the hajj, as shown by the trendline in Figure 18.   
 Like Central Java, West Sumatra’s pilgrims had also waited for a long time for 
their turn to perform the hajj. In July 2018, West Sumatra’s governor told the media 
that West Sumatra’s hajj applicants may have to wait for 17 years before they could 
perform the hajj (Cahyono 2018).  
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Figure 17. Number of pilgrims from West Sumatra for 1998 to 2017. Sources: BPS 
Sumatera Barat 2018, 300; BPS Sumatera Barat 2013, 189; BPS Sumatera Barat 2008, 
161; BPS Sumatera Barat 2002, 133.  
 
 
Figure 18. Number of pilgrims relative to Muslim population for West Sumatra from 
1998 to 2017. Population statistics for 1998, 1999, 2001 to 2003, and 2006 are 
interpolated using census data and statistics from Badan Pusat Statistik. Sources: BPS 
Sumatera Barat 2018, 173, 298, 300; BPS Sumatera Barat 2015, 199; BPS Sumatera 
Barat 2013, 189; BPS Sumatera Barat 2010, 61, 158; BPS Sumatera Barat 2009, 61, 
155; BPS Sumatera Barat 2008, 65, 159, 161; BPS Sumatera Barat 2006, 57, 147; 
BPS Sumatera Barat 2005, 147; BPS Sumatera Barat 2002, 133; Indiyanto 2013, 25.  
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For West Sumatra, statistics of religious rituals performed during Qurban are 
also available in the form of the quantity of livestock sacrificed during these rituals 
and the number of donors of these livestock. During Reformasi, the number of 
livestock sacrificed each year had come close to doubling between 1998 to 2017, 
increasing from 20,000 in 1998 to 38,000 in 2017 (see Figure 19). It can also be 
suggested that generally more Muslims in West Sumatra have participated in this 
ritual especially after 2004, with peak participation in 2013 with around 345,000 
participants, which is also around 7% of West Sumatra’s Muslim population (see 
Figure 19). (This also assumes that most participants in West Sumatra’s Qurban 
rituals were native to the province.) This significant increase in participation in 
Qurban ceremonies remains even after accounting for population growth during 
Reformasi, as indicated by the trendline in Figure 20. 
 
Figure 19. Qurban-related statistics for West Sumatra from 1998 to 2017. 
Sources: BPS Sumatera Barat 2018, 306; BPS Sumatera Barat 2013, 193; BPS 
Sumatera Barat 2008, 165; BPS Sumatera Barat 2002, 137. 
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Figure 20. Qurban participants relative to Muslim population for West Sumatra from 
1998 to 2017. Population statistics for 1998, 1999, 2001 to 2003, and 2006 are 
interpolated using census data and statistics from Badan Pusat Statistik. Sources: BPS 
Sumatera Barat 2018, 173, 298, 306; BPS Sumatera Barat 2015, 199; BPS Sumatera 
Barat 2013, 193; BPS Sumatera Barat 2010, 61, 158; BPS Sumatera Barat 2009, 61, 
155; BPS Sumatera Barat 2008, 65, 159, 165; BPS Sumatera Barat 2006, 57, 147; 
BPS Sumatera Barat 2005, 147; BPS Sumatera Barat 2002, 137; Indiyanto 2013, 25.  
 
It is thus plausible to tentatively suggest that there might have been an increase 
in Islamisation in West Sumatra during Reformasi, in the aspect of personal piety 
demonstrated through performance of significant Islamic rituals. As such, this increase 
in piety would have been arguably demonstrated through the increased participation in 
Qurban, in terms of both human and animal participation. At the same time, it is 
plausible that this increased piety did not result in any significant increases in hajj 
pilgrim numbers, given the long waiting list and high cost of going on hajj, thus pious 
but disappointed hajj aspirants in West Sumatra might have found Qurban an easier 
ritual to fulfil instead. But the ability to confirm or debunk such a hypothesis is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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Islamic Banking Services 
Background and relevance 
 It is possible to characterise the growth of Islamic banking in Indonesia as 
almost a purely Reformasi-era event. Although Indonesia’s first Islamic commercial 
bank, Bank Muamalat Indonesia, was founded in 1991, the growth of the industry only 
took off after the 1997-1998 economic crisis, when more Islamic banks began to 
emerge onto the scene (Juoro 2008, 229). Some scholars have suggested that this slow 
start was probably due to the Orde Baru regime’s concerns about potential political 
challenges from religious issues and actors, even as the regime became more 
accommodating of Islamic groups within society during this time (Sari, Bahari, and 
Hamat 2016, 180). This post-Orde Baru growth in Islamic banking was also facilitated 
by the 1998 Banking Law that allowed conventional banks to provide Islamic banking 
services and defined the Islamic banking services available in Indonesia (Juoro 2008, 
229). By 2007, there were a total of 142 Islamic banks in Indonesia, the majority (114) 
of which were Bank Pembiayaan Rakyat Syariah (BPRS) which were Islamic rural 
banks that had smaller capital investment requirements and offered only limited saving 
and financing services (Juoro 2008, 231-233). The remainder consisted of Islamic 
commercial banks and Islamic banking units owned by conventional banks (Juoro 
2008, 233). As of June 2018, the number of Islamic banks in Indonesia had increased 
to 202, the majority (168) of which were BPRS (OJK 2018, 2). 
 Some Islamic banks in Indonesia appear to have assumed that personal 
religiosity was a key motivating reason for Muslims to utilise Islamic banking 
services, given their significant usage of Islamic symbols such as Quranic verses, 
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imagery of religious sites, hijab-wearing women, and Islamic terms in their 
advertisements to attract customers (Arham 2013, 215-219). 
 But personal religiosity is more likely to be one of many reasons, rather than 
the key reason, in motivating Muslims to consume Islamic banking products. Prior 
research by Thomas Pepinsky had suggested religiosity may not be a primary 
consideration for an individual to consume Islamic banking services (Pepinsky 2013, 
162-163). At the same time, other research efforts have found that religiosity-related 
considerations such the bank’s profit-sharing and loss-sharing practices (Setiawan, 
Panduwangi, and Sumintono 2018, 1657), and Islamic banks’ non-usage of interest 
remain part of the reasons why consumers chose Islamic banking products (Abduh and 
Omar 2010, 9). 
As it remains plausible that the popularity of Islamic banking in a locale is to 
some degree related to the personal religiosity of the locale’s inhabitants, I will 
attempt to measure Islamisation in Central Java and West Sumatra by assessing the 
popularity of Islamic banking in these two provinces during Reformasi. 
 
Measurements: Central Java 
 Statistics from Indonesia’s central bank appear to suggest the popularity of 
Islamic banking in Central Java has increased during Reformasi. Between 2009 to 
2015, the total yearly value of loans issued by Central Java’s Islamic banks increased 
by four-fold for Islamic commercial banks and Islamic banking units, and five-fold for 
BPRS (see Tables 7 and 8). Similarly, both categories of Islamic banks experienced a 
62 
 
four-fold increase in the yearly total amount of funds deposited by its customers 
between 2009 and 2015 (see Tables 7 and 8).  
Table 7. Activity of Islamic commercial banks and Islamic banking units in Central 
Java from 2009 to 2015 (billion rupiah) 
Year 2009 2010 2011 2015 
Loans issued by Islamic banks 2,611 4,170 5,759 11,172 
As percentage of loans issued by non-
Islamic commercial banks 
2.9% 4.2% 4.7% 5.2% 
Funds deposited into Islamic banks 2,241 3,391 4,232 10,576 
As percentage of funds deposited into 
non-Islamic commercial banks 
2.3% 3.2% 3.4% 4.9% 
Sources: Bank Indonesia n.d.c, 40; Bank Indonesia n.d.b, 43; Bank Indonesia n.d.a, 
43; OJK 2015, 43; Bank Indonesia 2010a, 45; Bank Indonesia 2011a, 37; Bank 
Indonesia 2012a, 31; Bank Indonesia 2016a, xii. 
 
Table 8. Activity of Bank Pembiayaan Rakyat Syariah in Central Java from 2009 to 
2015 (million rupiah) 
Year 2009 2010 2011 2015 
Loans issued 104,775 159,991 223,000 545,123 
Funds 
deposited 
107,152 137,560 179,000 466,908 
Sources: Bank Indonesia n.d.c, 41; Bank Indonesia n.d.b, 44; Bank Indonesia n.d.a, 
44; OJK 2015, 44. 
  
Data from Indonesia’s financial services authority (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan – 
OJK) indicated that the total value of loans issued by Islamic banks in Central Java 
continued to grow by around 14% per year for both 2017 and 2018, while the total 
value of funds deposited into Islamic banks in Central Java also grew by 20% in 2017 
and 15% in 2018 (OJK 2017, 5; OJK 2018, 5). The OJK also ranked Central Java in 
both 2017 and 2018 as fifth among all Indonesian provinces in terms of total asset 
value for Islamic banks (OJK 2017, 4; OJK 2018, 4). 
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When compared against loans issued by and funds deposited with non-Islamic 
commercial banks, the data appears to suggest that an increased number of customers 
in Central Java are doing business with Islamic banks as compared to non-Islamic 
commercial banks between 2009 to 2016, although it should be noted that most of 
such financial services transactions are still performed with non-Islamic banks (see 
Table 7). 
 As such, it is possible that Islamisation may have taken place in Central Java in 
terms of the steady growth of popularity of Islamic banking within the province, 
although this conclusion should not be overstated given the lack of clarity on the 
growth in customer base, and the rationale of these new customers for using Islamic 
banking services.   
 
Measurements: West Sumatra 
 It appears that the popularity of Islamic banking in West Sumatra experienced 
a similar increase, but perhaps on a slightly smaller scale. Between 2009 to 2015, the 
yearly total value of loans issued by West Sumatra’s Islamic banks increased by four-
fold for Islamic commercial banks and Islamic banking units, and two-fold for BPRS 
(see Tables 9 and 10). As for the yearly total amount of funds deposited between 2009 
and 2015, the amount grew three-fold for Islamic commercial banks and Islamic 
banking units, and two-fold for BPRS (see Tables 9 and 10). 
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Table 9. Activity of Islamic commercial banks and Islamic banking units in West 
Sumatra from 2009 to 2015 (billion rupiah) 
Year 2009 2010 2011 2015 
Loans issued by Islamic banks 833 1,469 2,386 3,599 
As percentage of loans issued by non-
Islamic commercial banks 
4.9% 7.2% 8.3% 7.5% 
Funds deposited into Islamic banks 839 1,288 1,578 2,598 
As percentage of funds deposited into 
non-Islamic commercial banks 
5.2% 6.8% 6.9% 7.9% 
Sources: Bank Indonesia n.d.c, 40; Bank Indonesia n.d.b, 43; Bank Indonesia n.d.a, 
43; OJK 2015, 43; Bank Indonesia 2010b, 23; Bank Indonesia 2011b, 37; Bank 
Indonesia 2012b, 46; Bank Indonesia 2016b, 43. 
 
Table 10. Activity of Bank Pembiayaan Rakyat Syariah in West Sumatra from 2009 to 
2015 (million rupiah) 
Year 2009 2010 2011 2015 
Loans issued 56,656 72,258 91,000 138,525 
Funds 
deposited 
49,529 66,365 75,000 120,790 
Sources: Bank Indonesia n.d.c, 41; Bank Indonesia n.d.b, 44; Bank Indonesia n.d.a, 
44; OJK 2015, 44. 
 
Data from OJK indicated that growth in total value of funds deposited for 
Islamic banks in West Sumatra continued apace in 2017 and 2018 with around 11% 
growth each year, while the total value of loans issued decreased by around 1% for 
both years (OJK 2017, 5; OJK 2018, 5). 
When compared against loans issued by and funds deposited with non-Islamic 
commercial banks, the data appears to suggest that generally an increasing number of 
customers in West Sumatra are doing business with Islamic banks as compared to non-
Islamic commercial banks between 2009 to 2016, although it should be noted that 
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most of such financial services transactions are still performed with non-Islamic banks 
(see Table 9). 
Although West Sumatra’s growth rates for Islamic banking were relatively less 
impressive than those witnessed in Central Java over the same time period, there is 
arguably enough growth in Islamic banking in West Sumatra during Reformasi to 
suggest that some Islamisation in the form of increased popularity of Islamic banking 
had also taken place in the province. But the caveats against overstating this 
conclusion for Central Java would also apply to West Sumatra, as there is also a lack 
of clarity on the growth in customer base, and the rationale of these new customers for 
using Islamic banking services in the case for West Sumatra.   
 
Arabic Names 
Background and relevance 
 In recent decades, there has been a discernible increase in the adoption of 
cultural and social behaviour from Arabia into Indonesia, often done under the 
impression that the Arabic behaviour in question is worth adopting as it is more 
Islamic. Examples include the adoption of dressing styles associated with the Arab 
Middle East and eschewing dressing styles associated with Indonesia or the West, and 
the usage of Arabic phrases in everyday conversations instead of their Indonesian 
equivalents, such as using the Arabic greeting “as-salam alaykum” (which is also 
deemed to be more Islamic) instead of an Indonesian equivalent such as “selamat 
pagi” (Bruinessen 2018, 2-3). This preference for adopting Arabic cultural markers 
has extended into naming practices. 
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Measurements: Central Java 
 A 2016 study conducted in three villages of different socio-economic status 
within Central Java’s Klaten regency revealed that about 17.5% of the inhabitants of 
these three villages possessed Arabic names (Aribowo and Herawati 2016, 118). Upon 
further analysis, around 80% of these Arabic-named inhabitants were children, which 
is indicative of a recent Reformasi-era increase in interest by parents in giving their 
children Arabic names (Aribowo and Herawati 2016, 118-119). A separate 2014 study 
into naming conventions used by the inhabitants of Central Java’s Kudus regency also 
found that one common type of names that Kudus’ inhabitants were likely to have 
were names utilising Arabic words denoting beauty, piety or greatness (Widodo 2014, 
159).  
 In the absence of comprehensive data about naming conventions for the rest of 
Central Java, it can be deduced that these preferences for Arabic names are not 
confined to these specific villages and regencies in Central Java, as other studies have 
found similar trends in regions neighbouring Central Java. A 2017 study of 
Yogyakarta’s Bantul regency and East Java’s Lamongan regency and Lumajang 
regency had revealed a general increase since the 1990s in the bestowal of both Arabic 
names and hybrid names involving Arabic elements in these regions (Kuipers and 
Askuri 2017, 36-45). 
 Thus it can be presumed that some level of Islamisation had taken place in 
Central Java during the Reformasi time period, in the form of more of Central Java’s 
inhabitants bestowing Arabic names to their children in what is likely to be their effort 
to assume an identity that they perceive to be more Islamic. Unfortunately, I am 
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unable to conduct a similar analysis for West Sumatra due to the lack of similar prior 
studies into naming practices in that province. 
68 
 
Chapter 3 
Analysis  
 
 At this stage, I will aggregate and discuss my findings regarding the assessed 
extent of Islamisation in Central Java and West Sumatra, before comparing these 
findings against each other for further insights. 
 
Central Java 
 It is possible to tentatively conclude from my findings that Islamisation took 
place in Central Java during Reformasi, and that this Islamisation was primarily 
manifested in the personal and private domains in the form of an increased tendency to 
associate with Islam during decision-making for personal issues. This ranged from the 
relatively mundane, such as an increased preference for Islamic banking services, and 
possibly also going to the mosque more often or supporting mosque-building projects, 
or for relatively major life decisions such as deciding to have one’s children obtain an 
Islamic education, giving these children Arabic names, and setting aside a significant 
sum of money to perform the hajj pilgrimage.  
But this Islamisation does not appear to extend to the public sphere. Support 
for Islamic political parties has not grown in Central Java despite Islamisation. One 
possible explanation, derived from Merle Calvin Ricklefs’ study of Islamisation in 
Java is that as non-Islamic political parties had during Reformasi begun to routinely 
use Islamic symbols as part of their electoral campaigns, (Ricklefs 2012, 276-277), 
there might have been little reason for Islamised voters to switch their votes in favour 
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of an Islamic political party. Central Java’s politicians have generally avoided 
implementing perda syariah, probably in part due to the limited support for Islamic 
political parties in the province. There also appears to be little appetite among 
intolerant Muslims in the province to publicly display their intolerant beliefs. 
But more research would be needed to pinpoint exactly which segments of 
Central Java’s population has been Islamised, as this would better explain the presence 
or absence of Islamisation-related phenomena. For example, if Islamisation was taking 
place primarily among those who usually voted for Islamic political parties, one would 
not expect Islamisation in Central Java to lead to substantial gains for Islamic political 
parties in the immediate future. Nevertheless, it remains possible that continued 
Islamisation in the long-term may result in the emergence of more Islamisation-related 
phenomena across society in its various aspects. 
 
West Sumatra 
 It is also possible to tentatively conclude from these findings that Islamisation 
has also taken place in West Sumatra during Reformasi. Utilising the same public-
private dichotomy, it can be assessed that Islamisation had also manifested in the form 
of an increased tendency by Muslims to associate with Islam during their decision-
making for personal and private issues. For example, generally more Muslims in West 
Sumatra during Reformasi can be said to be using Islamic banking services, possibly 
going to the mosque more often or supporting mosque-building projects, participating 
in Qurban rituals, and perhaps also deciding on an Islamic education for their children. 
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 Unlike Central Java, Islamisation in West Sumatra has manifested in the public 
sphere. A significant portion of West Sumatra’s almost wholly-Muslim electorate has 
demonstrated a propensity to vote for Islamic political parties and candidates, 
including for Islamist politicians running on an Islam-heavy platform such as West 
Sumatra’s current governor, Irwan Prayitno.  Possibly partly encouraged by this pro-
Islam vote-bank, West Sumatra’s politicians have introduced a significant amount of 
perda Syariah in the province.  
Given the presence of Islamisation in both public and private spheres, 
questions about the presence of causality between the two spheres naturally follows. I 
would suggest that it is more likely that private and personal beliefs are influencing 
public and political behaviour, rather than vice-versa. Prior research in recent decades 
has indicated that the Minangkabau, who form the majority of West Sumatra’s 
inhabitants, were significantly Islamised in their personal beliefs and behaviour to 
begin with (Keddie 1987, 1-2; Simon 2012, 238-242), thus making it more likely that 
the policies and platforms adopted by Reformasi-era politicians in West Sumatra were 
their attempts to appeal to an electorate believed to be already pious. 
Thus it is also possible to similarly perceive the widespread implementation of 
perda Syariah in West Sumatra as attempts at winning support from a generally pious 
electorate. For example, given that prior research has suggested that a significant 
number of Minangkabau families and schools require adolescent females to adhere to 
adat (customary traditions) and Islamic teachings on female modesty (Parker 2009, 
67-68, 88-90), the implementation of perda Syariah requiring Muslim females to dress 
modestly in West Sumatra may be better perceived as the public and official 
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acknowledgement of pre-existing personal and private beliefs that are widely held 
within society, rather as a top-down Islamist attempt at shaping and controlling private 
behaviour.  
 Nevertheless, detailed research beyond the scope of this thesis would be 
required to pinpoint with greater clarity the nature of such public-private causations 
within these different aspects of Islamisation. In the meantime, these trends of 
Islamisation, both public and private, are likely to continue apace in West Sumatra.   
 
Comparing Central Java and West Sumatra 
 It is also possible to compare the findings for Central Java against those for 
West Sumatra to characterise their state of Islamisation relative to each other. Within 
the realm of politics and governance, there is little doubt that West Sumatra is more 
Islamised in its ways than Central Java in view of West Sumatra’s greater tendency to 
elect Islamic politicians, and the substantially greater number of perda Syariah in 
place in West Sumatra. 
 But despite this difference, the findings on private and personal choices made 
by individual Muslims suggest that the Muslim populations of both provinces have 
been Islamised to a similar degree during Reformasi. Regarding the degree of 
preference for an Islamic education for their children, both provinces have 
experienced largely similar substantial increases at both primary, lower secondary and 
upper secondary levels, with the only substantial difference being found in pesantren 
enrolment rates, where Central Java experienced a three-fold increase while there was 
no significant change for West Sumatra. A similar case can be made for mosque-
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building efforts and the popularity of Islamic banking services in both provinces, 
where both provinces experienced roughly similar increases in mosques built and the 
degree of increase in the popularity of Islamic banking services.  
 The only parameter where a substantial difference between the two provinces 
is apparent would be the number of pilgrims who embarked on the hajj pilgrimage 
during Reformasi. In this parameter, the overall 77% increase in Central Java’s yearly 
pilgrim rate from 1998-2017 clearly dwarfed the figures from West Sumatra, which 
essentially fluctuated and remained similar during this 20-year period. But it is not 
conclusive that this difference is indicative of lower piety levels in West Sumatra, 
given the hefty financial costs and long waiting time involved in performing the hajj, 
and findings that suggest increased piety among West Sumatran Muslims manifested 
through increased participation in religious rituals during Qurban. 
 Thus while my findings suggest that both provinces can be characterised as 
experiencing Islamisation during Reformasi, they also allow a depiction of West 
Sumatra as an area that has experienced more Islamisation as compared to Central 
Java, particularly in the public sphere of politics and governance. These findings are 
generally in line with earlier studies and observations about the increased role and 
influence of Islam in Indonesian politics and society during Reformasi.  
At the same time, these findings also surface the hypothesis that contrary to 
existing perceptions, the Minangkabau may not necessarily be significantly more 
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pious or religiously observant than other Indonesians.12 This is because, as was 
mentioned earlier, the findings suggest that regarding personal and private issues, 
Muslims in both West Sumatra and Central Java have experienced Islamisation in 
several similar aspects of their lives. Thus there are grounds to suspect that apart from 
the Javanese Muslims from Central Java, other Muslims in Indonesia may also have 
become more Islamised in recent decades, thus rendering Minangkabau religiosity less 
exceptional in today’s Indonesia. Further research beyond the scope of this thesis 
would be required to investigate this hypothesis. 
  Separately, the findings also suggest that increased Islamisation in the private 
and personal spheres may not necessarily result in changes in voting behaviour that 
favours Islamic political parties and candidates. This argument is most evident in the 
case of West Sumatra, where the vote-share of Islamic political parties in the 
provincial DPRD and the number of Islamic politicians from the province elected as 
DPR legislators decreased during Reformasi even as the almost wholly Muslim 
electorate was arguably becoming more Islamised at the same time. Similarly, the 
increased Islamisation of the population in Central Java did not appear to lead to any 
substantial gains for Islamic political parties and their candidates. Further research 
would be required to confirm and understand this phenomenon.  
 
                                                 
12 According to the 2010 census, 65% of Indonesia’s Minangkabau reside in 
West Sumatra. Riau is a distant second with 10%, followed by North Sumatra (5%), 
Jakarta (4%) and West Java (4%) (Na’im and Syaputra 2011, 36). 
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Chapter 4 
 Evaluation 
 
 I will now conclude this thesis with a discussion of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the methodology used to measure Islamisation in this thesis. To recap, 
the primary objective of this methodology was to facilitate the formation of 
meaningful prima facie assessments and observations about the state of Islamisation 
within a community, which can then be deployed to identify specific issues of concern 
and rationalise further research into these issues. This methodology was then tested 
out via two case studies where said methodology was applied to the Indonesian 
provinces of Central Java and West Sumatra. 
The case study had successfully demonstrated the methodology’s ability to 
aggregate and synthesise measurements about Islamisation in a heuristical manner 
across a variety of fields and subjects over a broad timespan, to produce broad yet 
meaningful and useful assessments regarding Islamisation. For example, this 
methodology has allowed me to assess that while both the Muslim populations in 
Central Java and West Sumatra have experienced Islamisation in their personal and 
private lives during Reformasi, West Sumatra appears to be slightly more Islamised 
than West Java as Islamisation has also taken place in West Sumatra’s politics and 
governance. My findings from the case studies have also identified areas of potential 
further research, namely that the Minangkabau today may not be significantly more 
pious or religiously observant than other Indonesians, and that the Islamisation of 
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culture and society might not necessarily lead to better electoral performances for 
Islamic political parties and politicians. 
 The case studies have also identified a key weakness of this method, which is 
that the measurements obtained from the parameters used may not necessarily be 
indicative of Islamisation. For example, a Muslim individual’s decision to enrol their 
children in an Islamic school need not necessarily stem from religious reasons, as non-
religious reasons such as proximity and the local reputation of a specific school are 
equally plausible. While this methodology has attempted to solve this problem by 
aggregating results at the provincial level, so as to capitalise on the working 
assumption that religious motivations are more likely to be represented in a larger 
sample size, this then leads to the possibility that the actual degree of Islamisation 
denoted by each measurement may vary from what the figures from each 
measurement appear to profess.  
Nevertheless, this weakness can be regarded as an inevitability given that the 
methodology is focused on producing a broad trend-based analysis, as opposed to a 
detailed investigative approach that would entail the careful exploration of the 
multiple possibilities of causality behind each specific data point.  
To conclude with a maddening aphorism, I would suggest that despite these 
drawbacks, this proposed methodology for measuring Islamisation is usable and has 
utility, so long as the methodology is deployed correctly, and its results interpreted 
appropriately.  
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